Pro-Natalist Policies in South Korea: Why Aren’t They Working?
Sherly Prince
It is a mutually agreed-upon fact that birth rates in East Asian countries are highly alarming. Among these, South Korea stands out as one of the countries most impacted by low fertility and puts the nation in danger of major population decline. To put this issue into perspective, “South Korea’s total fertility rate was 1.31 in 2001 and continued to fall to 1.08 in 2005. A series of
small increases and decreases followed, and as of 2016, the total fertility rate has settled at 1.17” (Bae 16). Government responses to these birth rates, however, have been increasingly unsuccessful. While a series of policies were launched to combat family related issues, “no improvement to speak of has been made on other policy areas including the labor market, housing, education, and gender equality” (Shin 6). As a result of the lack of appropriate policy making, there has been no tangible increase in child bearing and rearing; therefore, substantial policy change must be implemented. While pro-natal policies in South Korea have attempted to tackle low fertility rates through monetary compensation and anti-abortion sentiment, causes of low fertility are structural; therefore, policies implemented must address work-related and gender inequality-related factors.
Background
To provide a bit of background, South Korea’s fertility rates have been steadily declining since the 1970s. How has the region addressed these concerns thus far? They haven’t. While the South Korean government, in conjunction with various public institutions have attempted to address low fertility through monetary support for those with more than two children along with policy addressing abortions, they have failed to address the entrenched social and professional norms of the country. As cited in my structural analysis paper, the growing rates of low fertility in East Asia can be attributed to the lack of reconciliation between the labour market and motherhood and gender norms placed on working women. Policies implemented thus far have been ineffective due to the focus on specific issues rather than broad change. According to Peter McDonald, “The assumption of policy makers in East Asia has been that low fertility can be overcome by dealing with young people as individuals, not through broad social reform” (McDonald 22).
An important aspect to take into account when discussing pro natalist policies in South Korea is the anti natalist policies that came before it. Historically, the country actually worked to reduce its fertility rate as part of the economic development plan. In order to combat the struggling economy, the government aimed to solve overpopulation through policies including widespread distribution of contraceptives, financial support for sterilization, and education incentives (Kim 2). These policies underwent various changes; however, still continued until the mid-1990s. Due to this rapid shift in policy–within two decades–from anti natalist to pro-natalist, the effects of these policies were minimal.
Implemented Policies
Among the policies implemented in accordance with the Moo Hyun Roh’s–the president at the time–pro natalist plan in 2005 was a plan to tackle abortion rates. As stated by Sunhye Kim, “To boost fertility, the South Korean government revived the criminal code on abortion” (Kim 7). Rather than tackling the various social and familial effects on low fertility–the government focused their efforts on criminalizing abortion. Since between the 1960s and 1980s women were encouraged to use abortion and contraception due to overpopulation, the sudden shift to anti abortion laws were ineffective as well. Abortion was framed as a demographic challenge and therefore, many Korean women engaged in unsafe abortions (Kim 9). Rather than targeting major social change in response to low fertility, the Korean government dealt with individual cases of abortion. Issues regarding the freedom of women’s reproductive rights were brought up and the policies were soon repealed. To reiterate Peter McDonald’s point, rather than bringing social reform, low fertility was tackled in terms of young people and their individual issues. Another example of this can be seen under the same administration when they implemented a monetary compensation for having more than one child. While this benefitted some families, “policies for the reduction of the financial burden chiefly targeted those in the lower-income bracket (earning 70% or less than the average urban worker’s income, or 100% or less for families with two working parents” (Bae 18). Evidently, the outcomes were limited and had little to no impact on fertility rates in South Korea under this administration.
Solutions
In response to this inadequate policy development, what can be done to better combat the structural causes of low fertility in South Korea? The solution is three-fold. While there is no silver bullet or single policy to solve all of the nation’s fertility issues, more can be done in terms of policy reform. Due to low fertility being a structural issue deeply rooted in social expectations and work-place norms, solutions must effectively tackle all of these aspects.
Issues regarding low fertility are rooted in the societal expectations placed on women in order to fulfill domestic tasks including housework and child-rearing. “Low fertility in advanced countries is caused by an inconsistency between high levels of gender inequity in individual-oriented social institutions and sustained gender inequity in family-oriented social institutions,” namely, in the household (Bae 22). This results in a lack of reconciliation between work and motherhood. This can be targeted through increased policy reform in terms of increased maternity leave along with the introduction of paternity leave. According to Ji-Hey Bae, “ research has reported that a woman’s intention to have a second child becomes stronger in relation to the amount of time her husband spends on household chores” (Bae 22). Therefore, the introduction and implementation of paternity leave will combat gender norms and encourage equality within South Korean households.
Child-care policies and childbirth incentives can also be introduced to cover a more diverse set of factors. While some companies have implemented such policies, they have yet to become universal or nation-wide. Policies targeting the reconciliation of work and motherhood will successfully provide a sense of security, thus ensuring positive influence both a woman’s intention to have children and her childbearing behavior.
Conclusions
There are various structural causes for low fertility in South Korea including the lack of reconciliation between the labour market and motherhood and gender norms placed on working women. Due to the structural nature of this phenomenon, policy implementation must be structural as well. Rather than focusing on individual cases and implementing minor policies, the South Korean government must look to major social reform in order to target imminent population decline. By looking to solve social issues such as gender relations and the lack of reconciliation between motherhood and work, the government can more adequately restore birth rates to what they once were. If more is not done to combat these effects, the South Korean population will continue to decline and be in danger of a demographic crisis.
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